Re: East vs. West? Not that simple.

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: Good observations with the lack of the real data. : It you'll see somwhere by any chanse the data about following cities: Xarkiv, Doneck', Luhansk, KryvyjRih, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Vynnycia, Simferopil' with the detailed information regarding ukrainian schools and number of childrens being educated at fully ukrainian programs at these schools - please post the sources. : : : UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE RESOURCES : : http://matisse.ceu.hu/students/97/Roman_Zakharii/language.htm : : To get a deeper insight into the situation of Ukrainian : : language in Ukraine, I am presenting two interesting articles : : by a known Ukrainian publicist Taras Kuzio, who reflects : : below language situation in present day Ukraine. : : : : THE MYTH OF RUSSOPHONE UNITY IN : : UKRAINE : : By Taras Kuzio : : In the second round of Ukraine's July 1994 presidential elections, the incumbent, : : Leonid Kravchuk, won the majority of votes west of the River Dnipro and his : : main challenger, Leonid Kuchma, the majority east of that river. The larger urban : : and industrial centers of eastern Ukraine gave Kuchma a modest lead over : : Kravchuk. Since those elections, the prevailing view among many scholars and : : policymakers in the West has been that Ukraine is clearly divided into two : : linguistic halves: "nationalist, pro-European, and Ukrainophone" western Ukraine : : and "Russophile, pro-Eurasian and Russophone" eastern Ukraine. Unfortunately, : : this framework for understanding post- Soviet Ukraine has failed when it has : : been applied to the Kuchma. When elected in 1994, Kuchma was an eastern : : Ukrainian Russophone, and it was predicted that he would return Ukraine to : : Eurasia. Instead, Ukrainian foreign policy has remained consistent throughout the : : 1990s, regardless of the language spoken by the president or his support base. : : The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs defined this policy in 1996 as : : "Integration into Europe, Cooperation with the CIS," which continues to rule out : : Ukraine's participation in the military and political structures of the CIS. Under : : Kuchma, Ukrainian foreign policy has shifted westward more decisively, : : especially with regard to NATO. Ukraine has also been instrumental in : : preventing Russian regional hegemony through its membership in the : : pro-Western GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and : : Moldova) regional group, which in effect split the CIS into two groups of an : : equal number of states. Using language as the sole or main criterion by which to : : analyze post-soviet Ukrainian developments has proved to be flawed for two : : reasons. First, it assumed that Ukrainians belonged to either one or the other : : linguistic camp-- Ukrainophones or Russophones. Most observers argued that : : language data in the 1989 Soviet census were flawed and that the actual number : : of Ukrainophones was far smaller than the number of Russophones in Ukraine. : : Moreover, a large proportion of Ukrainians, perhaps even the majority, are : : bilingual and therefore cannot be characterized as either purely Ukrainophone or : : Russophone. Kuchma himself, for example, uses Ukrainian in public but has a : : Russian wife and almost certainly speaks Russian in the private sphere. Which of : : the two linguistic groups does he belong to? Data from an Intermedia National : : Survey in late 1999 conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology : : asked "In which language is it easier for you to talk?" Of the respondents, 44.2 : : percent said in Ukrainian and only 38.7 percent said in Russian. In response to : : the question "which language do you speak at home?" 47.8 percent said : : Ukrainian, 36.3 percent Russian, and 14.4 percent both. Second, there has been : : no evidence of the mobilization of Russophones as a group or lobby. Indeed, : : there is strong evidence that Russophones in Crimea, Odesa, the Donbas, Kyiv : : and western Ukraine have very distinct separate identities and have developed : : different attitudes toward the Ukrainian language, nation-building, and foreign : : policy. A recent study found that Russophones in Odesa and the Donbas exhibit : : "language retention," while in Kyiv and Lviv they favor assimilation or "language : : integration." A large number of Kyivites, for example, continue to use Russian as : : their main language but have not opposed sending their children to Ukrainian : : language schools, which now account for 80 percent of all schools in the city. A : : recent poll conducted in Kyiv by the National Democratic Initiatives Center : : among a representative sample of Kyivites was aimed at gauging the attitudes of : : Russian speakers and demonstrated this lack of uniformity among Russophones. : : Five main results emerged from the poll. First, 53 percent of Kyivites speak : : Russian always or most of the time. Of these respondents, 70 percent were : : brought up in a Russian-language environment. Second, half of these : : Russophones believe that the "Ukrainian language is an attribute of Ukrainian : : statehood." They feel that its usage in all spheres in the capital city does not : : reflect its state status and that there is still a need to raise its prestige. Moreover, : : according to these Russophones, state officials should take exams in the : : Ukrainian language to prove their proficiency. Only 30 percent of Russophones : : in Kyiv disagreed with these views. Three, two-thirds of Russophones in Kyiv : : feel that their rights as Russian speakers are not infringed on within a Ukrainian : : language information space. Four, 70 percent of Russophones in Kyiv believe : : that Ukrainian citizens should know the Ukrainian language well and 44 percent : : believe that they personally should improve their Ukrainian because it is : : important for them to do so. And five, only 43 percent of Russophones in Kyiv : : agreed raising the status of Russian to second state language. The organizers of : : the poll concluded that only up to one-third of Russophones in Kyiv are : : opponents of Ukrainianization. Meanwhile, 50-55 percent use Russian but : : remain positively disposed toward increased use of the Ukrainian language and : : do not see such a development as in any way harming their national dignity. : : Contemporary Ukrainian studies await further research into the myth of : : Russophone unity in Ukraine. Clearly the situation in Ukraine is far more : : complicated than a simplistic division of the country into two linguistic groups , : : one oriented toward Europe (Ukrainophones) and the other toward Eurasia : : (Russophones). If Ukraine's elites wish to maintain an independent state, they : : have no alternative but to continue with a policy of "Integration into Europe, : : Cooperation with the CIS." : : The author is a post-doctoral fellow at Yale University. 07-07-00 : : : : LANGUAGE AND NATIONALISM IN THE : : POST-SOVIET SPACE : : By Taras Kuzio : : A battle is raging over language in the post-Soviet space. Soviet nationality : : policies left a legacy of 25 million Russians and many more "compatriots," that is, : : Russian speakers, in countries of the former USSR excluding Russia. Moscow : : sees the continued use of the Russian language in former Soviet states with large : : numbers of Russophones as ensuring its continued influence over these countries. : : Russia has therefore praised Belarus and Kyrgyzstan for elevating Russian to : : second state language and official language respectively, and Kazakhstan's : : President Nazarbaev for proposing a CIS Fund to Promote the Russian : : Language. In June, Russian President Vladimir Putin suggested that if Moldova : : raised Russian to a second state language, Moscow would cease supporting the : : separatist Transdniester. And last month Russia released its new foreign policy : : concept, which seeks to "obtain guarantees for the rights and freedoms of : : compatriots" and "to develop comprehensive ties with them and their : : organizations." Currently, the State Duma is drafting a bill on the status of the : : Russian language in the CIS. By contrast, states such as Uzbekistan, : : Turkmenistan, and Ukraine are downgrading the status of Russian. In Ukraine, : : the language question has been the source of heated exchanges with Russia since : : last December, when the Constitutional Court ruled that all state officials should : : know and use Ukrainian and suggested how the constitutional provision for : : Ukrainian as the sole state language could be enforced. Deputy Prime Minister : : for the Humanities Mykola Zhulynskyi drew up a program for expanding use of : : the Ukrainian language, and a draft law was placed before the parliament that : : replaced Russian with Ukrainian as the "language for inter-communication" in : : Ukraine. In fact, Ukraine's policies on enhancing the Ukrainian language are : : similar to those advanced by President Putin, who in January established a : : Council on the Russian Language that aims to enhance the use of Russian both at : : home and abroad. One of the council's first moves was to order the Ministry of : : Education to fine Russian officials who have a poor command of Russian. This : : summer, Russia and Ukraine began to trade accusations after nationalist : : demonstrations in Lviv followed the death of Ihor Bilozir, a popular singer who : : was killed by two Russophones after he refused to stop singing Ukrainian songs. : : The Lviv Oblast Council responded by limiting the use of Russian in public : : places, including popular music in cafes, and in business circles. Radical : : nationalist parties formed volunteer squads to monitor the application of these : : new rules. On 7 June, the Russian Foreign Ministry condemned the "anti-Russian : : hysteria" sweeping western Ukraine, and 10 days later, Russian Ambassador to : : Ukraine Ivan Aboimov complained about the alleged official encouragement of : : the Russophobic campaign against the Russian language. The Ukrainian Foreign : : Ministry rejected these allegations and the right of Russia to speak on behalf of : : Russians and "compatriots." The Russian State Duma, for its part, provoked : : further tensions by accusing Ukraine of having violated the provisions on national : : minorities in the May 1997 Russian-Ukrainian treaty. It went on to demand that : : Putin adopt the necessary measures to halt the alleged discrimination. The : : Ukrainian parliament rejected all the Duma's accusations as a "manifestation of : : interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state." The increased use of : : Ukrainian in education throughout the 1990s has inevitably led to a : : commensurate decline in the use of Russian. The Ukrainian parliament sees this : : as "the Ukrainian authorities' intention to secure the inalienable and natural right : : of Ukrainian citizens to use their mother tongue," and it has rejected accusations : : that this is in any way "racially discriminatory." Within the CIS, according to the : : Ukrainian lawmakers, Kyiv's nationality policies are "balanced and far-sighted," : : leading to "interethnic accord and peace." In claiming that Ukraine had violated : : the 1997 treaty, the State Duma pointed to Article 12, which outlines the : : obligation of both states to ensure the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious : : identity of national minorities in each country. The status of Ukrainians in Russia : : and Russians in Ukraine was the subject of a visit to the two countries by OSCE : : High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoel, last month. : : However, it is Russia--not Ukraine--that has breached Article 12. Although the : : 4.5 million-strong Ukrainian community constitutes the second-largest national : : minority in the Russian Federation (after Tatars), they do not have a single : : Ukrainian school, theater, or newspaper. Parishes of the Ukrainian Orthodox : : Church-Kyiv Patriarch have been forcibly abolished. In Ukraine, where Russians : : are the largest minority, constituting 22 percent of the population, 33 percent of : : pupils and students are enrolled in Russian- language schools and universities. : : And also in Ukraine, 1,193 newspapers are published in Russian, compared with : : 1,394 in Ukrainian. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarch : : continues to boast the largest number of parishes. While the Lviv Oblast Council : : resolutions detailing language requirements in the private sector are excessive, the : : region remains more tolerant than either the Donbas or Crimea. A Sotsis-Gallup : : opinion poll on ethnic tolerance found Crimea to be the most intolerant among : : Ukraine's regions. Although Ukrainians make up a quarter of the Crimean : : population, only four of 582 Crimean schools (0.69 percent) are Ukrainian, and : : only one out of 392 publications on the peninsula is in Ukrainian. In the Donbas, : : where Ukrainians constitute 50 percent of the population, the proportion of : : pupils in Ukrainian language schools is still only 10 percent. : : The author is honorary research fellow, Stasiuk Program on Contemporary : : Ukraine at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta. : : 03-08-00