[aaus-list] Will the Near Abroad Go Nuclear?

[Oleh S. Ilnytzkyj]

Absolutely excellent commentary! Let's hope someone is listening.



Oleh S. Ilnytzkyj, Professor
Modern Languages and Cultural Studies
University of Alberta * 200 Arts Building * Edmonton, AB T6G 2E6
TEL (780) 492-9225 * FAX 492-9106

Modern Languages and Cultural Studies:
http://www.mlcs.ca







On 9/10/08 6:26 AM, "ajmotyl at andromeda.rutgers.edu"
<ajmotyl at andromeda.rutgers.edu> wrote:

>> From the Atlantic Council website, www.acus.org
> 
> http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/will-non-russians-go-nuclear
> 
> 
> Will the Near Abroad Go Nuclear?
> Alexander Motyl | September 10, 2008
> As Europe redefines its security interests vis-à-vis Russia in the
> aftermath of Vladimir Putin¹s war against Georgia, both sides have
> reverted to the kind of geopolitical thinking that, while reasonably
> accurate during the Cold War, is devoid of reality today. Both European
> and Russian analysts and policymakers make the strategic mistake of
> thinking that all that matters is the relationship between the West and
> Russia. They forget that the collapse of the Soviet Union brought into
> existence a plethora of non-Russian states as committed to defending their
> security and sovereignty as, say, Germany and Russia are committed to
> defending theirs.
> 
> Putin¹s Russia sees many of the non-Russian states in its ³near abroad² as
> former or future vassals. Western Europe in general and France and Germany
> in particular see these states as obstacles to Europe¹s ability to acquire
> cheap Russian gas and balance against the United States. Both sides act as
> if the non-Russian states did not exist or were, at most, pawns on some
> ³grand chessboard.²
> 
> Of course, these states do exist, and they do have interests that cannot
> be easily ignored or reduced to a footnote in Western-Russian relations.
> Stable relations between Europe and Russia depend on stable relations
> between them and Russia¹s neighbors. Europe and Russia cannot be secure,
> and their relations cannot be stable and mutually beneficial, if the
> security of Russia¹s neighbors is neglected. Indeed, relations between
> Europe and Russia can be secure only if Russia¹s neighbors are secure.
> 
> Unfortunately, the predictably anemic European response to the war in
> Georgia and the growing Western tendency to rethink grand strategy as if
> the non-Russians did not matter has taught the non-Russians that the West
> in general and ³old Europe² in particular will more than happily sacrifice
> the security, and perhaps even the sovereignty, of the "near abroad" on
> the altar of Russian gas
> 
> How do states that face existential threats invariably respond to such
> threats? Contrary to the implicit expectations of European policymakers
> and analysts, the non-Russians‹in particular Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova,
> Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan‹will not just roll over and accept a
> fait accompli crafted in Berlin, Paris, or Brussels. Instead, they will
> seek existential solutions to existential threats.
> 
> At a minimum, this means beefing up substantially their defense
> expenditures, crafting anti-Russian alliances, and subordinating economic
> reform to the exigencies of security. More likely than not, the
> non-Russian states that feel most threatened by Russia will follow in
> Israel¹s footsteps and seek security guarantees from the United States and
> shelter under the American nuclear umbrella. At a maximum, this means
> doing exactly what the Israelis have done: secretly acquiring nuclear
> weapons. All the ex-Soviet states have the know-how to build nuclear
> reactors and weapons; Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan even inherited
> hundreds of warheads after the collapse of the Soviet Union. And some of
> their leaders have openly expressed regret at having transferred them to
> Russia in the early 1990s.
> 
> If Europe remains indifferent to the fate of the non-Russian states and
> continues to demonstrate its willingness to subordinate them to Russia¹s
> great-power aspirations, the non-Russians will, unsurprisingly and
> predictably, become increasingly indifferent to Berlin¹s obsession with
> cheap gas and Paris¹s obsession with balancing the Americans. At some
> later point, integration into Europe will be abandoned as a policy goal
> and democracy will be junked for the same kind of Russian-style
> authoritarianism and hyper-nationalism that provokes so little criticism
> in the Europe of Gerhard Schroeder and Sylvio Berlusconi. Soon thereafter,
> the entire former Soviet space‹including some of the east European states
> already part of the European Union‹could easily come to consist of angry,
> suspicious, and aggressive authoritarian states that threaten the
> stability of all of Europe.
> 
> Ironically, the first casualty of such growing interstate tensions may be
> Russia. Despite Putin¹s bluster and quick victory over tiny Georgia,
> Russia remains weak, corrupt, and unstable. And, with its propensity to
> ³talk loudly while carrying a small stick,² Russia will be prone to
> militarist adventurism, overreach, crisis, and even collapse. Whether
> Russia¹s eventual destabilization involves a regional war or massive
> popular unrest, it will affect many non-Russian states as well‹and, not
> incidentally, lead to disruptions in energy deliveries to Europe.
> 
> Once a new time of troubles sets on Russia and its neighbors, Europe just
> might realize that the non-Russians did matter after all‹and that a
> serious effort to integrate Russia¹s key neighbors into NATO and the EU in
> the immediate aftermath of the Russo-Georgian war could have sufficiently
> reassured nervous non-Russians to allay their fears of isolation and
> prevent a desperate search for security.
> 
> Alexander J. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers
> University-Newark.  AP Photo by Sergei Chuzavkov via Daylife.
> 
> 
> 
> 
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