[Aaus-community-list] [aaus-list] Op-Ed by A. Motyl in the WSJE

[ajmotyl at andromeda.rutgers.edu]

Wall Street Journal Europe, March 30, 2010

Ukraine's Democracy in Danger

By Alexander J. Motyl

As Ukraine's recently elected President Viktor Yanukovych prepares to
visit Washington in April, he will aim to project an image of stability,
confidence, and control. In reality, Mr. Yanukovych has committed a series
of mistakes that could doom his presidency, scare off foreign investors,
and thwart the country's modernization.


Mr. Yanukovych's first mistake was to violate the constitution by changing
the rules according to which ruling parliamentary coalitions are formed,
making it possible for his party to take the lead in partnership with
several others, including the Communists. That move immediately galvanized
the demoralized opposition that clustered around his challenger in the
presidential elections, former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko.


His second mistake was to appoint as prime minister his crony Mykola
Azarov, a tough bureaucrat whose name is synonymous with government
corruption, ruinous taxation rates, and hostility to small business. The
appointment dispelled any hopes Ukrainians had that Mr. Yanukovych would
promote serious economic reform.


His third mistake was to agree to a cabinet consisting of 29 ministers as
opposed to 25 before-an impossibly large number that will only compound
its inability to engage in serious decision making. That the cabinet
contained not one woman-Mr. Azarov claimed that reform was not women's
work-only reinforced the image of the cabinet as a dysfunctional boys'
club.


His fourth mistake was to appoint two nonentities-a former state farm
manager, and an economics graduate from a Soviet agricultural institute-to
head the ministries of economy and finance. Meanwhile, he created a
Committee on Economic Reform, consisting of 24 members, to develop a
strategy of economic change. The size of the committee guarantees that it
will be a talk shop, while the incompetence of the two ministers means
that whatever genuinely positive ideas the Committee develops will remain
on paper.


His fifth mistake was to appoint the controversial Dmytro Tabachnik as
minister of education. Mr. Tabachnik has expressed chauvinist views that
democratically inclined Ukrainians regard as deeply offensive to their
national dignity, such as the belief that west Ukrainians are not real
Ukrainians; endorsing the sanitized view of Soviet history propagated by
the Kremlin; and claiming that Ukrainian language and culture flourished
in Soviet times. Unsurprisingly, many Ukrainians have reacted in the same
way that African Americans would react to KKK head David Duke's
appointment to such a position-with countrywide student strikes,
petitions, and demonstrations directed as much at Mr. Yanukovych as at Mr.
Tabachnik.


These five mistakes have effectively undermined Mr. Yanukovych's
legitimacy within a few weeks of his inauguration. The 45.5% of the
electorate that voted against him now feels vindicated; the 10-20% that
voted for him as the lesser of two evils now suspect that their fears of
Mrs. Tymoshenko's authoritarian tendencies were grossly exaggerated. And
everyone worries that Mr. Yanukovych and his band of Donbas-based "dons"
are ruthlessly pursuing the same anti-democratic agenda that sparked the
Orange Revolution of 2004.


Several other key dismissals and appointments have only reinforced this
view. The director of the Security Service archives-a conscientious
scholar who permitted unrestricted public access to documentation
revealing Soviet crimes-has been fired. The National Television and Radio
Company has been placed in the hands of a lightweight entertainer expected
to toe the line. Most disturbing perhaps, several of Mr. Yanukovych's
anti-democratically inclined party allies have been placed in charge of
provincial ministries of internal affairs-positions that give them broad
scope to clamp down on the liberties of ordinary citizens.


Democratically inclined Ukrainians are increasingly persuaded that Mr.
Yanukovych wants to become Ukraine's version of Belarus's dictator,
Alexander Lukashenko. But Mr. Yanukovych's vision of strong-man rule rests
on a strategic, and possibly fatal, misunderstanding of Ukraine.


First, the Orange Revolution and five years of Viktor Yushchenko's
presidency empowered the Ukrainian population, endowing it with a
self-confidence that it lacked before 2004 and consolidating a vigorous
civil society consisting of professionals, intellectuals, students, and
businesspeople with no fear of the powers that be. Mr. Yanukovych's
efforts to establish strong-man rule already are, and will continue to be,
resisted and ridiculed by the general population.


Second, Ukraine's shambolic government apparatus cannot serve as the basis
of an effective authoritarian government. Tough talk alone will fail to
whip a bloated bureaucracy into shape. Worse, Ukraine's security service
and army are a far cry from those in Belarus. Mr. Yanukovych may try to
emulate Mr. Lukashenko, but without a strong bureaucracy and coercive
apparatus, he will fail.


Third, with an ineffective cabinet, all decision making will be
concentrated in Mr. Yanukovych's hands. Even if one ignores his deficient
education and poor grasp of facts, Mr. Yanukovych's appointment of Mr.
Tabachnik demonstrates that Ukraine's president is either completely out
of touch with his own country, or arrogantly indifferent to public
opinion.


Fourth, Ukraine is still in the throes of a deep economic crisis. If Mr.
Yanukovych does nothing to fix the economy, Ukraine may soon face default,
and mass discontent among his working class constituency in the southeast
is likely. If Mr. Yanukovych does embark on serious reforms, that same
constituency will suffer and strikes are certain. So negotiating the
crisis will require popular legitimacy-which Mr. Yanukovych is rapidly
squandering; a strong government-which he does not have; and excellent
judgment-which is also missing from the equation.


Indeed, if Mr. Yanukovych keeps on making anti-democratic mistakes, he
could very well provoke a second Orange Revolution. But this time the
demonstrators would consist of democrats, students, and workers. The
prospect of growing instability will do little to attract foreign
investors, while declining legitimacy, growing incompetence, and tub
thumping will fail to modernize Ukraine's industry, agriculture, and
education. Mr. Yanukovych could very well be an even greater failure as
president than Mr. Yushchenko.


Although the outlook is grim, it is not yet hopeless for Ukraine's new
president. He could still grasp a modest victory from the jaws of an
embarrassing defeat by ruling as the president, not of Donetsk, but of all
Ukraine. All he has to do is restrain his appetite for power and learn to
rule with the opposition and with the population. It's not so
complicated-it's democracy.


Mr. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark.

-----Original Message-----
From: ajmotyl at andromeda.rutgers.edu [mailto:ajmotyl at andromeda.rutgers.edu]
Sent: 27 March 2010 10:10
To: Jolis, Anne
Subject: RE: [Fwd: RE: op-ed submission from Alexander Motyl]


Dear Anne:
I just realized that the first line of par. 2 is wrong. Yanukovych did not
"overhaul the Constitution and change the rules". Instead, he "violated
the Constitution by changing the rules."
Best, alex

> Dear Dr. Motyl,
>
> Thanks very much for this. I've inserted your answers into the text
> and tried to smooth it out a bit -- if you could please take a look
> and let me know if this works for your, or  if you would like to make
> any other changes, by all means go ahead. There may be a final round
> of editing after this, but I just want to make sure that I've
> understood your answers correctly. Also, please note that I've tacked
> on an extra last line, just for rhythm's sake -- if that or anything
> else is not to your liking, by all means cut or change it as you see fit.
>
> No rush on this, whenever you get a chance to turn it around, and
> thanks very much.
>
> Best,
> Anne
>
>
> By Alexander J. Motyl
> As Ukraine's recently elected President Viktor Yanukovych prepares to
> visit Washington in April, he will aim to project an image of
> stability, confidence, and control. In reality, Mr. Yanukovych has
> committed a series of mistakes that could doom his presidency, scare
> off foreign investors, and thwart the country's modernization.
>
> Mr. Yanukovych's first mistake was to overhaul the Constitution and
> change the rules according to which ruling parliamentary coalitions
> are formed, making it possible for his party to take the lead in
> partnership with several others, including the Communists. That move
> immediately galvanized the demoralized opposition that clustered
> around his challenger in the presidential elections, former Prime
Minister Yulia Tymoshenko.
>
> His second mistake was to appoint as prime minister his crony Mykola
> Azarov, a tough bureaucrat whose name is synonymous with government
> corruption, ruinous taxation rates, and hostility to small business.
> The appointment dispelled any hopes Ukrainians had that Mr. Yanukovych
> would promote serious economic reform.
>
> His third mistake was to agree to a cabinet consisting of 29 ministers
> as opposed to 25 before-an impossibly large number that will only
> compound its inability to engage in serious decision making. That the
> cabinet contained not one woman-Mr. Azarov claimed that reform was not
> women's work-only reinforced the image of the cabinet as a dysfunctional
boys'
> club.
>
> His fourth mistake was to appoint two nonentities-a former state farm
> manager, and an economics graduate from a Soviet agricultural
> institute-to head the ministries of economy and finance. Meanwhile, he
> created a Committee on Economic Reform, consisting of 24 members, to
> develop a strategy of economic change. The size of the Committee
> guarantees that it will be a talk shop, while the incompetence of the
> two ministers means that whatever genuinely positive ideas the
> Committee develops will remain on paper.
>
> His fifth mistake was to appoint the controversial Dmytro Tabachnik as
> Minister of Education. Mr. Tabachnik has expressed chauvinist views
> that democratically inclined Ukrainians regard as deeply offensive to
> their national dignity, such as Mr. Tabachnik's belief that west
> Ukrainians are not real Ukrainians; his endorsement of the sanitized
> view of Soviet history propagated by the Kremlin; and his claims that
> Ukrainian language and culture flourished in Soviet times.
> Unsurprisingly, many Ukrainians have reacted in the same way that
> African Americans would react to KKK head David Duke's appointment to
> such a position-with country-wide student strikes, petitions, and
> demonstrations directed as much at Mr. Yanukovych as at Mr. Tabachnik.
>
> These five mistakes have effectively undermined Mr. Yanukovych's
> legitimacy within a few weeks of his inauguration. The 45.5% of the
> electorate that voted against him now feels vindicated; the 10-20%
> that voted for him as the lesser of two evils now suspect that their
> fears of Mrs. Tymoshenko's authoritarian tendencies were grossly
> exaggerated. And everyone worries that Mr. Yanukovych and his band of
Donbas-based "dons"
> are ruthlessly pursuing the same anti-democratic agenda that sparked
> the Orange Revolution of 2004.
>
> Several other key dismissals and appointments have only reinforced
> this view. The director of the Security Service archives-a
> conscientious scholar who permitted unrestricted public access to
> documentation revealing Soviet crimes-has been fired. The National
> Television and Radio Company has been placed in the hands of a
> lightweight entertainer expected to toe the line. Most disturbing
> perhaps, several of Mr. Yanukovych's anti-democratically inclined
> party allies have been placed in charge of provincial ministries of
> internal affairs-positions that give them broad scope to clamp down on
the liberties of ordinary citizens.
>
> Democratically inclined Ukrainians are increasingly persuaded that Mr.
> Yanukovych wants to become Ukraine's version of Belarus's dictator,
> Alexander Lukashenko. But Mr. Yanukovych's vision of strong-man rule
> rests on a strategic, and possibly fatal, misunderstanding of Ukraine.
>
> First, the Orange Revolution and five years of Viktor Yushchenko's
> presidency empowered the Ukrainian population, endowing it with a
> self-confidence that it lacked before 2004 and consolidating a
> vigorous civil society consisting of professionals, intellectuals,
> students, and businesspeople with no fear of the powers that be. Mr.
> Yanukovych's efforts to establish strong-man rule already are, and
> will continue to be, resisted and ridiculed by the general population.
>
> Second, Ukraine's shambolic government apparatus cannot serve as the
> basis of an effective authoritarian government. Tough talk alone will
> fail to whip a bloated bureaucracy into shape. Worse, Ukraine's
> security service and army are a far cry from those in Belarus. Mr.
> Yanukovych may try to emulate Mr. Lukashenko, but without a strong
> bureaucracy and coercive apparatus, he will fail.
>
> Third, with an ineffective cabinet, all decision making will be
> concentrated in Mr. Yanukovych's hands. Even if one ignores his
> deficient education and poor grasp of facts, Mr. Yanukovych's
appointment of Mr.
> Tabachnik demonstrates that Ukraine's president is either completely
> out of touch with his own country, or arrogantly indifferent to public
> opinion. Neither trait will serve him well in running a country on his
> own, especially as buck passing will be impossible.
>
> Fourth, Ukraine is still in the throes of a deep economic crisis. If Mr.
> Yanukovych does nothing to fix the economy, Ukraine may soon face
> default, and mass discontent among his working class constituency in
> the southeast is likely. If Mr. Yanukovych does embark on serious
> reforms, that same constituency will suffer and strikes are certain.
> So negotiating the crisis will require popular legitimacy-which Mr.
> Yanukovych is rapidly squandering; a strong government-which he does
> not have; and excellent judgment-which is also missing from the equation.
>
> Indeed, if Mr. Yanukovych keeps on making anti-democratic mistakes, he
> could very well provoke a second Orange Revolution. But this time the
> demonstrators would consist of democrats, students, and workers. The
> prospect of growing instability will do little to attract foreign
> investors, while declining legitimacy, growing incompetence, and tub
> thumping will fail to modernize Ukraine's industry, agriculture, and
> education. Mr. Yanukovych could very well be an even greater failure
> as president than Mr. Yushchenko.
>
> Although the outlook looks grim, it is not yet hopeless for Ukraine's
> new president. He could still grasp a modest victory from the jaws of
> an embarrassing defeat by ruling as the president, not of Donetsk, but
> of all Ukraine. All he has to do is restrain his appetite for power
> and learn to rule with the opposition and with the population. It's
> not so complicated
> - it's democracy.
>
> Mr. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers
> University-Newark.
>
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: ajmotyl at andromeda.rutgers.edu
> [mailto:ajmotyl at andromeda.rutgers.edu]
> Sent: 25 March 2010 16:51
> To: Jolis, Anne
> Cc: Carney, Brian
> Subject: [Fwd: RE: op-ed submission from Alexander Motyl]
>
> MANY THANKS! THE CHANGES ARE BELOW IN CAPS. BEST, AJM
>
> Dear Dr. Motyl,
>
> Anne Jolis here with the WSJ Europe. My colleague Brian had me look at
> your excellent oped on President Yanukovych, which we would like to
> publish soon. I paste below a lightly edited version, with a few
> questions and clarifications inserted. If you could please look these
> over and get back to me when you get a moment with the answers
> inserted, as well as any other changes you see fit, I'd be most grateful.
>
> Thanks again and all the best,
> Anne
>
>
> By Alexander J. Motyl
> As Ukraine's recently elected President Viktor Yanukovych prepares to
> visit Washington in April, he will aim to project an image of
> stability, confidence, and control. In reality, Mr. Yanukovych has
> committed a series of mistakes that could doom his presidency, scare
> off foreign investors, and thwart the country's modernization.
>
> Yanukovych's first mistake was to violate the Constitution and change
> the rules according to which ruling parliamentary coalitions MUST
> CONSIST OF PARTIES WITH A 226-VOTE MAJORITY, THEREBY ENABLING HIS
> PARTY OF REGIONS TO REACH THAT NUMBER WITH THE HELP OF THE COMMUNISTS,
> THE LYTVYN BLOC, AND INDIVIDUAL DEPUTIES. That move immediately
> galvanized the demoralized opposition that clustered around his
> challenger in the presidential elections, former Prime Minister Yulia
Tymoshenko.
>
> His second mistake was to appoint as prime minister his crony Mykola
> Azarov, a tough bureaucrat WHOSE NAME IS SYNONYMOUS WITH government
> corruption, RUINOUS TAXATION RATES, and HOSTILITY to small business.
> The appointment dispelled any hopes Ukrainians had that Yanukovych
> would promote SERIOUS economic reform.
>
> His third mistake was to agree to a cabinet consisting of 29
> ministers--FOUR MORE THAN TYMOSHENKO'S--an impossibly large number
> that WILL ONLY COMPOUND its inability to engage in serious decision making.
> That the cabinet contained not one woman-Mr. Azarov claimed that
> reform was not women's work-only reinforced the image of the cabinet
> as a dysfunctional OLD boys' club.
>
> His fourth mistake was to appoint two nonentities to head the
> ministries of economy AND FINANCE, while creating a Committee on
> Economic Reform, consisting of 24 members, to develop a strategy of
> economic change. THE MINISTER OF THE ECONOMY ONCE RAN A STATE FARM AND
> SERVED AS A THUGGISH MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR IN 2006-2007; THE
> MINISTER OF FINANCE HAS A DEGREE IN ECONOMICS FROM A SOVIET
> AGRICULTURAL INSTITUTE AND ACQUIRED MOST OF HIS GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCE
> IN THE NOTORIOUSLY CORRUPT STATE TAX ADMINISTRATION The size of the
> Committee guarantees that it will be a talk shop. The incompetence of
> the two ministers means that whatever genuinely positive ideas the
Committee develops will remain on paper.
>
> His fifth mistake was to appoint the controversial Dmytro Tabachnik as
> Minister of Education. Mr. Tabachnik has expressed chauvinist views
> that democratically inclined Ukrainians regard as deeply offensive to
> their national dignity. MR. TABACHNIK BELIEVES THAT WEST UKRAINIANS
> ARE NOT REAL UKRAINIANS, ENDORSES THE SANITIZED VIEW OF SOVIET HISTORY
> PROPAGATED BY THE KREMLIN, AND ARGUES THAT UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE AND
> CULTURE FLOURISHED IN SOVIET TIMES. UNSURPRISINGLY, MANY UKRAINIANS
> HAVE reacted in the same way that African Americans would react to KKK
> head David Duke's appointment to such a position-with country-wide
> student strikes, petitions, and demonstrations directed as much at Mr.
Yanukovych as at Mr. Tabachnik.
>
> These five mistakes have effectively undermined Mr. Yanukovych's
> legitimacy within a few weeks of his inauguration. The 45.5% of the
> electorate that voted against him now feels vindicated; the 10-20% OF
> THOSE VOTERS WHO SUPPORTED YUSHCHENKO, ARSENIY YATSENIUK, AND SERHII
> TYHYPKO IN THE FIRST ROUND AND THEN voted for MR. YANUKOVYCH as the
> lesser of two evils now SUSPECTS that their fears of Mrs. Tymoshenko's
> authoritarian tendencies were grossly exaggerated. AND EVERYONE
> WORRIES that Mr. Yanukovych and his band of Donbas-based "dons" are
> ruthlessly pursuing the same anti-democratic agenda that sparked the
> Orange Revolution of 2004.
>
> Several other key dismissals and appointments have only reinforced
> this view. The director of the Security Service archives-a
> conscientious scholar who permitted unrestricted public access to
> documentation revealing Soviet crimes-has been fired. The National
> Television and Radio Company has been placed in the hands of a
> lightweight entertainer expected to toe the line. Most disturbing
> perhaps, several of Mr. Yanukovych's anti-democratically inclined
> party allies have been placed in charge of provincial ministries of
> internal affairs-positions that give them broad scope to clamp down on
the liberties of ordinary citizens [CORRECT? YES!].
>
> Democratically inclined Ukrainians are increasingly persuaded that Mr.
> Yanukovych wants to become Ukraine's version of Belarus's dictator,
> Alexander Lukashenko. But Mr. Yanukovych's vision of strong-man rule
> rests on a strategic, and possibly fatal, misunderstanding of Ukraine.
>
> First, the Orange Revolution and five years of Viktor Yushchenko's
> presidency empowered the Ukrainian population, endowing it with a
> self-confidence that it lacked before 2004 and consolidating a
> vigorous civil society consisting of professionals, intellectuals,
> students, and businesspeople with no fear of the powers that be. Mr.
> Yanukovych's efforts to establish strong-man rule already are, and
> will continue to be, resisted and ridiculed by the general population.
>
> Second, Ukraine's shambolic government apparatus cannot serve as the
> basis of an effective authoritarian government. Tough talk alone will
> fail to whip a bloated bureaucracy into shape. Worse, Ukraine's
> security service and army are a far cry from those in Belarus. Mr.
> Yanukovych may try to emulate Mr. Lukashenko, but without a strong
> bureaucracy and coercive apparatus, he will fail.
>
> Third, with an ineffective cabinet, all decision making will be
> concentrated in Mr. Yanukovych's hands. Even if one ignores his
> deficient education and poor grasp of facts, Mr. Yanukovych's
appointment of Mr.
> Tabachnik demonstrates that Ukraine's president is either completely
> out of touch with his own country, or arrogantly indifferent to public
> opinion. Neither trait will serve him well in running a country on his
> own, especially as buck passing will be impossible.
>
> Fourth, Ukraine is still in the throes of a deep economic crisis. If Mr.
> Yanukovych does nothing to fix the economy, Ukraine may soon face
> default, and mass discontent among his working class constituency in
> the southeast is likely. If Mr. Yanukovych does embark on serious
> reforms, that same constituency will suffer and strikes are certain.
> So negotiating the crisis will require popular legitimacy-which Mr.
> Yanukovych is rapidly squandering; a strong government-which he does
> not have; and excellent judgment-which is also missing from the equation.
>
> Indeed, if Mr. Yanukovych keeps on making anti-democratic mistakes, he
> could very well provoke a second Orange Revolution. But this time the
> demonstrators would consist of democrats, students, >>and<< workers
> [>>AND<< SHOULD BE ITALICIZED: THE WORKERS WOULD BE NEW]. The prospect
> of growing instability will do little to attract foreign investors,
> while declining legitimacy, growing incompetence, and tub thumping
> will fail to modernize Ukraine's industry, agriculture, and education.
> Mr. Yanukovych could very well be an even greater failure as president
than Mr.
> Yushchenko.
>
> Although the outlook looks grim, it is not yet hopeless for Ukraine's
> new president. He could still grasp a modest victory from the jaws of
> an embarrassing defeat by ruling as the president, not of Donetsk, but
> of all Ukraine. All he has to do is restrain his appetite for power
> and learn to rule with the democratic opposition and with the population.
>
> Mr. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers
> University-Newark.
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Sternberg, Joseph
> To: Alex Motyl <ajmotyl at andromeda.rutgers.edu>; Carney, Brian
> Sent: Wed Mar 24 05:57:12 2010
> Subject: FW: op-ed submission from Alexander Motyl
>
> Hi Alexander,
>
> Thanks for sending this along. Please note that I am no longer in
> Brussels. I was only there temporarily over the summer, and am now
> back at my base in Hong Kong with the Journal's Asian edition. I'm
> passing this along to the European editorial page editor, Brian Carney
> (cc'ed above), who will get back to you.
>
> Regards,
> Joe
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: ajmotyl at andromeda.rutgers.edu
> [mailto:ajmotyl at andromeda.rutgers.edu]
> Sent: Wednesday, March 24, 2010 5:54 PM
> To: eliza.gray at wsj.com; Sternberg, Joseph
> Subject: op-ed submission from Alexander Motyl
>
> Dear Ms. Gray and Mr. Sternberg,
> The piece below and attached--on Ukrainian President Yanukovych's
> early mistakes--may be of interest, especially as he is slated to
> visit Washington on or about April 12.
> You may recall that I co-wrote the piece on Mazepa and Poltava with
> Adrian Karatnycky last year.
> Best wishes,
> ajm
>
>
> Yanukovych Stumbles
>
> Alexander J. Motyl
> Professor of Political Science
> Rutgers University-Newark
> ajmotyl at andromeda.rutgers.edu
> Draft of March 24, 2010; 918 words
>
> As Ukraine's recently elected president, Viktor Yanukovych, prepares
> to visit Washington in mid-April, he will project an image of
> stability, confidence, and control. In reality, Yanukovych has
> committed a series of mistakes that could doom his presidency, scare
> off foreign investors, and fail to modernize the country.
>
> Yanukovych's first mistake was to violate the Constitution and change
> the rules according to which ruling parliamentary coalitions are
> formed. That move immediately galvanized the demoralized opposition
> clustered around his challenger in the presidential elections, former
> Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko.
>
> His second mistake was to appoint as prime minister his crony Mykola
> Azarov, a tough bureaucrat known for his indifference to government
> corruption and opposition to small business. The appointment dispelled
> any hopes Ukrainians had that Yanukovych would promote economic reform.
>
> His third mistake was to agree to a cabinet consisting of 29
> ministers-an impossibly large number that guarantees its inability to
> engage in serious decision making. That the cabinet contained not one
> woman-Azarov claimed that reform was not women's work-only reinforced
> the image of the cabinet as a dysfunctional boys' club.
>
> His fourth mistake was to appoint two nonentities to head the
> ministries of finance and economy, while creating a Committee on
> Economic Reform, consisting of 24 members, to develop a strategy of
> economic change. The size of the Committee guarantees that it will be
> a talk shop, while the incompetence of the two ministers means that
> whatever genuinely positive ideas the Committee develops will remain on
paper.
>
> His fifth mistake was to appoint the controversial Dmytro Tabachnik as
> Minister of Education. Tabachnik has expressed chauvinist views that
> democratically inclined Ukrainians regard as deeply offensive to their
> national dignity. And they reacted in the same way that African
> Americans would react to KKK head David Duke's appointment to such a
> position-with country-wide student strikes, petitions, and
> demonstrations directed as much at Yanukovych as at Tabachnik.
>
> These five mistakes have effectively undermined Yanukovych's
> legitimacy within a few weeks of his inauguration. The 45.5 percent of
> the electorate that voted against him now feels vindicated; the 10-20
> percent that voted for him as the "lesser of two evils" now believes
> that their fears of Tymoshenko's authoritarian tendencies were grossly
> exaggerated and that Yanukovych and his band of Donbas-based "dons"
> are ruthlessly pursuing the same anti-democratic agenda that sparked the
Orange Revolution of 2004.
>
> Several other key dismissals and appointments have only reinforced
> this view. The director of the Security Service archives-a
> conscientious scholar who permitted unrestricted public access to
> documentation revealing Soviet crimes-has been fired. The National
> Television and Radio Company has been placed in the hands of a
> light-weight entertainer expected to toe the line. Most disturbing
> perhaps, several undemocratically inclined party allies have been
> placed in charge of provincial ministries of internal affairs.
>
> Democratically inclined Ukrainians are increasingly persuaded that
> Yanukovych wants to become Ukraine's version of Belarus's dictator,
> Alexander Lukashenko. But Yanukovych's vision of strong-man rule rests
> on a strategic, and possibly fatal, misunderstanding of Ukraine.
>
> First, the Orange Revolution and the five years of the Viktor
> Yushchenko presidency empowered the Ukrainian population, endowing it
> with a self-confidence that it lacked before 2004 and consolidating a
> vigorous civil society consisting of professionals, intellectuals,
> students, and businesspeople with no fear of the powers that be.
> Yanukovych's efforts to establish strong-man rule already are, and
> will continue to be, resisted and ridiculed by the general population.
>
> Second, Ukraine's shambolic government apparatus cannot serve as the
> basis of an effective authoritarian government. Tough talk alone will
> fail to whip a bloated bureaucracy into shape. Worse, Ukraine's
> security service and army are a far cry from those in Belarus.
> Yanukovych may try to be Lukashenko, but without a strong bureaucracy
> and coercive apparatus, he will fail.
>
> Third, with an ineffective cabinet, all decision making will be
> concentrated in Yanukovych's hands. Even if one ignores his deficient
> education and poor grasp of facts, Yanukovych's appointment of
> Tabachnik demonstrates that Ukraine's president is either completely
> out of touch with his own country or arrogantly indifferent to public
> opinion. Neither trait will serve him well in running a country on his
> own, especially as buck passing will be impossible.
>
> Fourth, Ukraine is still in the throes of a deep economic crisis. If
> Yanukovych does nothing to fix the economy, Ukraine may soon face
> default and mass discontent among his working class constituency in
> the south-east of the country is likely. If Yanukovych does embark on
> serious reforms, that same constituency will suffer and strikes are
> certain. Negotiating the crisis will require popular legitimacy-which
> Yanukovych is rapidly squandering, a strong government-which he does
> not have, and excellent judgment-which is also missing from the equation.
>
> Indeed, if Yanukovych keeps on making anti-democratic mistakes, he
> could very well provoke a second Orange Revolution. But this time the
> demonstrators would consist of democrats, students, and workers. The
> prospect of growing instability will do little to attract foreign
> investors, while declining legitimacy, growing incompetence, and tub
> thumping will fail to modernize Ukraine's industry, agriculture, and
> education. Yanukovych could very well be an even greater failure as
> president than Yushchenko.
>
> Although the outlook looks grim, it is not yet hopeless for Ukraine's
> new president. He could still grasp a modest victory from the jaws of
> an embarrassing defeat by ruling as the president, not of Donetsk, but
> of all Ukraine. All he has to do is restrain his appetite for power
> and learn to rule with the democratic opposition and with the population.
>
>
>
>
>


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