[Aaus-community-list] The 2008 Political Year: Review without Lessons...

[Kostyantyn Mykhailychenko]

Research Update. Vol. 15, Ð 1/561, 10 January 2009

The 2008 Political Year: Review without Lessons...

By Yulia Kyseliova, UCIPR analyst

In 2009, political Ukraine will face the same 
problems as in 2008. Moreover, the situation is 
only
worsening in view of the long-lasting crisis in Ukraine's politics and economy.

For Ukraine, 2008 marked not only another 
calendar period of counting lost opportunities and
chances for development and internal reforms. 
Political events that occurred over that difficult
period only aggravated contradictions and the 
general ongoing crisis of the political system and
gave rise to additional risks of the country's 
existence on the whole. By efforts of 
politicians, the
country gradually turned into a zone of 
traditional political instability as it is often 
characterized
in political scientific studies and became a synonym for this definition.

Crisis phenomena in Ukrainian politics are 
manifested in permanent competition between power
and the opposition, which is halved by nature in 
Ukraine because the opposition strives not only
to come to power but also incorporate into the 
system of power relations adhering to rules of the
game it has criticized before. Competition is 
also manifested in confrontation between branches
of power disguising business interests, which 
causes the further development of trends towards
the merger of interests of the large capital and 
politics. This is confirmed by the direct presence
of business in the political process and the 
lobbying of personal interests by certain 
political
groups attempting to monopolize parties in the Verkhovna Rada.

The state of affairs in the country is similar to 
Hobbs's pre-state war of all against all. Such
quasi-hostilities entail the absence of reforms 
as politicians just discuss the need for 
reforming.
The only exception is the education reform, which 
however comes in for criticism and certain
objections.

The year 2008 was also marked with paralyzed 
parliamentarism and the developed total
tendency to the absence of political 
responsibility for promises. Specifically, at the 
2nd session of
the Verkhovna Rada of the 6th convocation, only 
45 out of 245 bills provided for by the coalition
agreement between BYuT and OUPSD were considered, 
of which just 11 were approved.

One of tasks of parliament and power on the 
whole, to carry out the constitutional reform as a
method and tool for understanding between elites, 
power and society, has never been fulfilled.
Consequently, a desire of different political 
forces to amend the Constitution became rather a
subject of political manipulations motivated by 
immediate career prospects of their certain
representatives. Politicians failed to reach a 
public consent on ways for improving the Basic
Law. Specifically, opinions on Ukraine's 
transformation into a parliamentary republic or 
the
return to pro-presidential models of government 
changed proportionally to the remoteness of
prospects of the PR, BYuT or the reminder of OU 
to affect the opportunity of getting definite
offices. Promises to abolish or legally regulate 
deputy immunity have never germinated with
effective legislative initiatives on the field of 
Ukrainian populism. The electoral law, 
facilitating
the election of "pigs in a poke" and untouchable 
influence of a party leader on party processes
(funding for parties, formation of closed party 
lists, distribution of offices etc.), remained 
frozen
as well.

The fate of the law on the Cabinet of Ministers 
of Ukraine was sad. Like the political reform, it
not only meant a legislative act that has to 
determine and regulate power relations but also
played the role of a joker in the political pack.

The renewal or formation of the parliamentary 
majority of a part of OU, BYuT and Lytvyn's
Bloc lacking for 226 MPs was another political paradox.

The political year 2008 has again emphasized 
powerful personalization of the Ukrainian 
political
scene, where it is not political parties but 
their leaders that are active actors. A few 
persons make
decisions for all. Such personification and 
dependence of parties upon popularity of 
exclusively
their own leaders make the importance of 
parliament just a mask and substitute principles 
of
collective decision-making and pluralism. 2008 
passed in the weakening of political parties as
collective institutions.

The 2008 events, in particular, the conflict 
between Russia and Georgia demonstrated once again
the absence of a consolidated position of 
Ukrainian politicians on a choice of the 
geo-political
future and strategic directions of Ukraine's 
development on the whole. Specifically, this
concerns Euro-Atlantic integration. The support 
to independence of the South Ossetia on the part
of the PR prejudiced the adequate understanding, 
by this political force, of geopolitical realities
and possible risks for Ukraine in the Crimean 
context of such statements and such public
positioning. Ukraine has never joined the MAP in 
NATO and European leaders have got tired
with Ukrainian uncertainty. This is especially so 
because today's energy dependent Europe
chooses a policy of appeasement towards Russia. 
In view of the EU support, Ukraine that annoys
the RF with its NATO and Euro-integration 
aspirations does not fit in with the above 
tactics.
Hence, a window of opportunities of 2005 has been 
actually closed in 2008 as regards foreign
political dimensions. At the NATO Bucharest 
summit on April 3, Ukraine's joining the MAP
was denied and postponed until December. In the 
long run, NATO suggested Ukraine a new
format of relations in the framework of the so-called Annual Target Plan.

The financial and economic crisis experienced by 
other European states is getting more serious
in Ukraine because of the ongoing political 
crisis. The latter is determined by the 
ineffective
functioning of the country's political system, 
the immaturity of political elites, antipodal
personal and command party interests, the 
inability to reach compromise on issues of 
political
co-existence and collapse of the judiciary. By 
the way, as far as the latter is concerned, the
situation is only getting worse, the level of 
social trust in judicial institutions is falling 
and judges
still feel pressure by the mighty. Evaluating the 
level of independence of judges in 2008
compared to results of the study carried out in 
the framework of the Ukrainian-Swiss Project on
"Support for Judicial Reform in Ukraine. 
Promoting the Strengthening of Judges' 
Independence"
in 2007, one can see the increased level of 
contempt of court on the part of the President of
Ukraine (55% against 50% in 2007), 
representatives of the large business (56% 
against),
journalists (45% against 40%), entrepreneurs (36% 
against 28%) and citizens (45% against
20%). The polling of judges, attorneys and bar 
lawyers evidences the high level of efforts to
impact court's positions during proceedings. 71% 
(against 77%) of polled judges, 54% (against
67%) of attorneys and 81% (against 89%) of bar 
lawyers confirmed their awareness of such
instances.

There is no room for optimism as concerns the 
anti-corruption campaign. Ukraine did not
progress here.  Specifically, the Transparency 
International Corruption Perception Index slid by
2 scores over last year and amounted 2.5 out of a 
possible 10 as of mid-2008. Index below 3
indicates galloping inflation in Ukraine. 
Transparency International believes that such a 
low
Corruption Perception Index evidences the 
negative image of Ukraine's institutional 
framework
and low investment attractiveness of the country abroad.

The economic decline could only indirectly be 
explained by global financial and economic
trends because in general, some countries do not 
experience such a sharp worsening of economic
indicators. According to data of the Ministry of 
Economy of Ukraine, in January-November
2008, the real GDP increased by 3.6% compared to 
the same period of the previous year (in 2007
- by 7.2%), while the nominal GDP within the 
report period was roughly estimated as worth
UAH 875,376 million. Notwithstanding a 13% 
decrease of prices for gasoline, transport costs
grew by 1.9% on the whole, which is caused by a 
15.9% rise in prices for urban passenger
transport.

Within January-October 2008, nominal income of 
the population made up UAH 684.6 billion,
41.6% up from the same period of 2007. The 
population's nominal income for purchase of goods
and services increased by 41.4% compared to the 
same period of the previous year, while real
income of the population with regard to the price 
factor grew by 12.4% (against 12.6% in 2007).
In November 2008, real wage was 6.2% and 0.2% 
down from the previous month and the same
period of 2007 respectively. Within 
January-October 2008, real wages increased by 7.2%
compared to the same period of 2007.

In 2008, the inflation rate was 22.3% as compared 
to 16.6% in 2007. Such poor indicators of
Ukraine's economic development are determined by 
policy of total populism in the social area,
the absence of social reforms, the deficient 
system of privileges and the weak pension reform
despite 14 million pensioners in the country. The 
2008 national budget provided for UAH
3,557,234.7 thousand in expenditure for the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Policy of Ukraine to 
be
spent for the implementation of 39 budget 
programs. According to data of the Ministry of 
Labor,
UAH 3,463,953.7 or 97.4 % of appropriations 
planned for January-November 2009 were funded
as of December 18, 2008. Meanwhile, as is 
evident, the above statistical data are given not 
on the
number of services rendered to a specific person 
but in general equivalent, which complicates the
evaluation of their efficiency.

Consequences of populist slogans multiplied by 
the absence of modernization of metallurgical,
coal and machine-building enterprises and the 
weakness of Ukraine's domestic market actually
result in the worsening of the economic situation 
in general, when there are too many weak links
in the system and too many ties are broken.

Next year will be a year of trials for not only 
politicians as regards their ability to agree 
again so
that to prevent the economy from getting in the 
deadlock but also society in general. This
concerns forecasted protest actions as a result 
of the worsened social situation, sentiments and
social illusions about the "mighty hand" that 
will appear, bring order and return the "embezzled
funds". Recent developments demonstrate that 
politicians have a temptation to take advantage of
authoritarianism scenarios with all negative 
consequences for the social development.
Experience of guided democracy in the RF speaks 
for itself and the above objectified sentiments
will not only fail to meet the challenge but also 
throw Ukraine a couple of years back.

Next year, political processes in Ukraine will 
radicalize in view of the economic and political
crisis and the upcoming presidential elections. 
Logic of another electoral year will also shape
behavior of political parties and their leaders. 
As a result, populism will not decrease, which 
adds
yet another risk to the total of negative 
factors. Parliament will not work normally 
regarding the
weak majority, which will give additional 
occasion to situational political accords and the 
low
level of predictability of respective decisions. 
Taking into account the energy crisis, its foreign
political accents and unwillingness of Old Europe 
to spoil relations with Russia, the pressure of
the latter on Ukraine will increase and get more 
inexorable. Whether we want it or not, 2009
might be a year of economic slump, which could 
deteriorate because of the political uncertainty
and the immaturity of political elites.