BRAMA, April 18, 2003, 1:00 am ET
Kak-a-yak?
Somewhat random musings and mutterings about
Ukraine’s language policy
– By Hanya Krill
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The
Ukrainian language is as distinct from Russian as Spanish or Italian are from
French, and Romance languages are an instinctive source of pride for their
respective nations, just as Ukrainian is for Ukrainians. Except, of course,
for the Russophones who aspire to blur the distinction between Ukrainian and
Russian. Communist Party deputies recently submitted two separate pieces of
legislation to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine that would serve to marginalize
Ukraine’s constitutionally designated state language and ultimately subordinate
it to Russian. What should Ukraine do about it?
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It’s no surprise that my
relatives speak Ukrainian – they are natives of Ukraine and
nationalists or the more politically correct “patriots” (not the missiles).
One of the more tangible expressions of Ukrainian nationalism has been a preference
for the Ukrainian language over Russian. Thus, when my cousin came to visit
us in the States in the mid-90’s, a few years after Ukraine’s Independence
was declared from the Soviet Union, it was no surprise to hear him declare
how happy he was with the turn of events. “Ìåí³ âæå íàäî¿ëî òî ðîñ³éñüêå êàêàííÿ!,” he declared
(loose translation: “I’m sick and tired of that Russian ‘shitting’!”).
Forgive the obscenity. This
requires an explanation for those who don’t speak Ukrainian or Russian. In
Russian, the word “êàê” means “how” (“ÿê”, pronounced
“yak” in Ukrainian). Although the word “êàê” has
no meaning at all in Ukrainian, “êàêàòè” (pronounced
“kakaty”) means “to defecate,” or in more colloquial terms, “to shit,” and “êàêàííÿ” (pronounced
“kakannia”) is the gerundive form of “to shit,” or literally, “shitting.” My cousin, in
other words, tired of being compelled to speak Russian, was jubilant that
Ukrainian was once and for all established as the official language of his
country.
I share this story not to
cast aspersions on the Russian language, but merely to convey the utter
joy many Ukrainians felt that they would no longer be pressured into
using a language which they considered to be foreign and one with associations
to centuries of oppression – a situation that may
change if certain politicians in Ukraine have their way. During a visit to New York
in July 2002 Ukrainian diplomat and politician Gennadiy Udovenko predicted that
“ratification of Russian as a state language alongside with Ukrainian is likely
to be passed in the fall.” He was almost right, and there is reason for concern.
The state of the State language
Nearly twelve years after
independence (1991) or seven years after the adoption of the first post-USSR
constitutional code (1996), the official status of the Ukrainian language
and its implementation have not been fully embraced, at least not by the Russian-speaking
population of Ukraine. From the start of Ukraine’s foray into a new future,
the suggestion that the Russian language be eliminated from common usage has
led to indignant cries of discrimination. It was at the very least inconvenient
for “native” Russian-speakers to suddenly switch to Ukrainian. Schoolchildren
would suffer, it was said, because more textbooks were available in Russian.
Some argued that roughly 17% (~22% prior to the last census) of Ukraine’s population,
the ethnically Russian
part, would become marginalized as communication would be too difficult using
the national language. (It is noteworthy to mention here that Russians often
claim that there is so little difference between the two languages that there
is no reason why Ukrainians cannot easily shift to Russian. Apparently the
reverse is not true.)
None of the above happened,
of course, as Russian has retained it’s place as lingua
franca in much of Ukraine. It is widely used in the capital, Kyiv,
in eastern and southern Ukraine, and is reportedly gaining ground even in
Lviv, a stoically Ukrainian-speaking city. Ukrainians in the Diaspora return
from trips to the motherland shaking their heads in disappointment at the
their dashed hopes that the Ukrainian language would quickly take
root and flourish in a post-Soviet democracy. Expectations that constitutional
legislation would provide the underpinnings for a trend to popularize the
Ukrainian language have given way to fears that the new democracy will instead
give Russophones the ammunition to derail the potential for a fresh Ukrainian
future.
My greatest lament is that
just as my command of Ukrainian has started showing signs of improvement,
opportunities to use it when traveling in Ukraine may become scarce.
Communists wag their tongues
On November 26, 2002, a
proposal (see Bill 2457) that would fundamentally change the language provision in Ukraine’s constitution
was quietly slipped in by Verkhovna Rada Deputy from Crimea,
V.A.Myronenko
(Communist Party of Ukraine). The bill reads like a radical manifesto by a
Russophile from the communist era with justifications based on spurious arguments
that smack of Russian hegemony – an attitude that may well be tolerable in Russia,
but is patently out of place in Ukraine.
Mr. Myronenko proposes that
the Russian language should enjoy equal status in Ukraine in all spheres and
at all levels: government, business, school, culture, science, mass media,
postal service, courts. The proposed bill demands that the Russian language
not be discriminated against in any sphere of society. Yet no corresponding
text in Mr. Myronenko’s proposed legislation would protect the Ukrainian language
in the same way.
In addition, Mr. Myronenko’s
rationalization includes a myriad of examples of other countries that have
adopted multi-lingual systems. He is apparently oblivious to the fact that
in many of those countries the multiplicity of languages has led to many age-old
disputes that are unresolved even today. Prime examples are the very ones
that he uses to support his argument, such as Canada and Belgium.
He argues that because Russian
is one of the official languages of international organizations such as the
United Nations and UNESCO and because so many Russian language publications
are already available, the gains outweigh the losses. Yet the potential loss
of the Ukrainian language is obviously not a concern to Mr. Myronenko.
Mr. Myronenko even goes
as far as to suggest that adoption of his bill will serve to “unite the Ukrainian
nation.” The fact that Ukrainians are already united as a nation has apparently
escaped his attention.
On the 17th of
December 2002 shortly before Ukraine’s Supreme Council closed for the holidays,
a shorter bill (see Bill 2459)
with even more confusing terminology, was proposed by Deputy
Leonid Hrach
(another communist from Crimea).
What is intriguing about
this language bill is, well, the language. The amendment proposes to “permit”
use of Ukrainian as the “state” language and Russian as the “official” one.
What, exactly, does that mean? In typical Soviet-style doublespeak, it means
that no one will be exactly sure how to interpret the constitutional intent.
It means that whoever is in a power position will determine what language
is used within their sphere of control. In many cases, it suggests that the
choice will be to use Russian rather than Ukrainian.
What makes the Hrach bill
especially suspicious is that it would amend a constitutional article that
originally had no reference to language whatsoever. The generic title of the
bill “Proposed bill about changes to article 38 of the Constitution of Ukraine”
(Ïðîåêò Çàêîíó ïðî âíåñåííÿ çì³í äî ñòàòò³ 38 Êîíñòèòóö³¿ Óêðà¿íè) doesn’t
even hint at its intent to add Russian to the constitution as an official
language .
On careful reading, in fact, Russian is already given ample
protection by Article 10 of the constitution, more so even than any other
minority language spoken in Ukraine: “ Óêðà¿í³ ãàðàíòóºòüñÿ â³ëüíèé ðîçâèòîê,
âèêîðèñòàííÿ ³ çàõèñò ðîñ³éñüêî¿, ³íøèõ ìîâ íàö³îíàëüíèõ ìåíøèí Óêðà¿íè.”
(The development, use and protection of the Russian language,
and other languages of minority populations are guaranteed in Ukraine.)
Not only is Russian not repressed in Ukraine, as one friend pointed out,
but one can find a surprisingly large number of state-funded Russian-language schools
and institutions of higher learning, Russian theaters, as well as a surfeit of newspapers
published in Russian, more even than in Ukrainian. Along the same lines, another source
informs me that funding for Ukrainian language papers has been curtailed in order to
provide more support for Russian publications which are protected under the law! How
bizarre is that?
The truth is that if any language is in need of guaranteed
protection, it's Ukrainian.
The authors of both proposed bills are clearly seeking to make
the distinction between “state” and “official” language an amorphous one.
Their objective can only be to deliberately obfuscate the constitutional details
and confound the public enough so that the choice will be to speak Russian rather
than Ukrainian. The end game is likely to be to be a drive to purge the Ukrainian
language from the constitution altogether.
It comes as no surprise
that Communist Party of Ukraine deputies drafted the proposed legislation.
The CPU’s pro-Russian biases have never been a secret. It isn’t even surprising
that a significant number of non-communist politicians would support such a constitutional change
in view of their indoctrination under the Russo-Soviet system. The only
puzzle in this scenario is that the patriotic opposition has not come up with
counter-proposals of their own. Why not, for the sake of argument, strike
the word “Russian” from the constitution altogether? Why not propose a bill
even more radical than the Myronenko proposal and ban the Russian language
from use by government officials? In a zero-sum civilization such as ours
is, the ultimate choice by V.R. deputies may very well be to leave everything
status quo because the risk
of either side winning would be too great.
Okay, I admit it – I’m prone
to wishful thinking sometimes.
History and ex-Republic solutions
Language issues in the multi-lingual
societies of Imperial Russia and the former Soviet Union have always been
problematic. After 350 years of Russian control over ethnically Ukrainian
territory, with the last 70 years under Russo-Soviet domination, the Russian
language has (un)naturally come to be favored in some cases over the national
or indigenous language. As in the case of Ukraine, whenever the natives got
restless in the non-Russian Soviet Republics, or if Moscow needed to deflect
attention from more serious issues (sure, you have no food, but now you can
speak Ukrainian amongst yourselves while you’re not eating!), the government
would issue decrees that appeared to support indigenous languages – whenever
and for as long as it suited them to do so. But just when nationalistic proclivities
began to surface, Moscow would clamp down again and reinstate Russian as the
language de jure.
In Kyrgyzstan, another former
Soviet republic, post-independence drives to eliminate the Russian presence
from the country were rapidly put in reverse by the powerful Russian lobby
to the point of adopting a constitutional change in which the Russian language
is fully protected by the constitution (Article 5: The Kyrgyz Republic guarantees
the preservation, equal and free development and functioning of the Russian
language and all the other languages, used by the population of the Republic).
When last I heard, all official documents were recorded both in Kyrgyz and
Russian. In Kazakhstan, although Kazakh is the designated state language,
Russian shares equal status with it. (Article 7: In state institutions and
local self-administrative bodies the Russian language shall be officially
used on equal grounds along with the Kazakh language.) Russian hegemony has
retained a visible foothold in those two former Republics.
The Baltic countries, in
contrast, latecomers to the Soviet fold having been invaded only during World
War II, dealt with their language issue in clear and decisive, one might even
say incisive terms. Estonia’s, Latvia’s, and Lithuania’s constitutions all
unambiguously identify their sole national languages as the official or state
ones. Russian is not mentioned at all, not even for special protection as
a minority language.
In Ukraine, although constitutionally
the official language is Ukrainian, Russian has continued to be the working
language of choice by many politicians and officials, and even in the diplomatic
corps’ back offices. President Kuchma has often been scorned for speaking
a form of mixed Ukrainian and Russian called “surzhyk”.
(The current American president’s college C-average notwithstanding, I think
that President Kuchma should at least get a “C” for taking a crack at it,
but that’s just my generous nature.) The usual justifications for not
speaking Ukrainian are that the politicians trained in Moscow or were educated
in institutions where Russian was the language of instruction. Opposition
to the use of Russian in those circles has come from patriotic and nationalistic
(nothing wrong with that) politicians, and across the country mainly from
the public in the Western regions where Ukrainian has remained the dominant
language.
A peek@other national linguistic dilemmas
My Ukrainian friend Oksana’s
favorite comparison was France. “How would it look,” she would say, “if a
representative to the French parliament stood up and spoke in Spanish? He
would be clubbed to death or at the very least laughed out of Parliament.”
The French are definitely snobbish about their language. They can afford to
be snobs about it – after all, French is a beautiful language (so is Ukrainian,
and I’m not saying this just because my heritage happens to be Ukrainian).
The upper crust of almost every society covets the French language. French-speaking
diplomats at the United Nations walk taller than the rest. Canadians in Quebec
are adamant about speaking French, as is the French population residing in
Belgium. Belgians in French-speaking regions of the country even tear down
street signs that are according to law written in the 2 other official languages,
Flemish and German. French “ueber alles” – oops, should that be “sur tous”? –
in those countries!
A cursory look at the constitutional
provisions for language in these and other countries comes up with a few interesting
paradigms. In France, even though as many as 75 different languages are spoken
there, it comes as no surprise that the official language is French. Bilingual
Canada provides constitutionally equal official status for English and French,
with certain decisions as to their use being left up to the provincial governments.
Belgium’s situation is similar in that the constitution recognizes three regional
languages and officially allows for their use at various governmental levels.
The problem is, as stated earlier, that neither Canada nor Belgium has resolved
the domestic sparring between the various linguistic groups.
The Constitution of the
United States, on the other hand, does not assign any official or national
or state language on a federal level. Many U.S. States, however, have adopted
language legislation: 20 have “English Only” laws and 2 have adopted bilingual
legislation (Hawaii, New Mexico). U.S. Protectorate Puerto Rico’s official
languages are English and Spanish. The constitutionality of the state laws
is often challenged in the courts in cases claiming discrimination of one
form or another. Surveys show that the country as a whole is divided on questions
surrounding a federal policy on language. The topic has taken a back seat
been to more pressing issues such as the war with Iraq and the post-9/11 recovery,
but now, more than two hundred years after its independence from Great Britain,
bills on appending a language amendment to the U.S. constitution are being
proposed in Congress.
What choice does a country have?
If a lesson from history
can be used as a model for the future, one might study early 20th
Century settlement of Ukrainians in the United States. After taking care of
basic needs such as shelter, one of the first immigrant community actions
taken was to construct or purchase a church facility. Church was a traditional
social center for immigrants, and in Ukrainian culture, often the most important
one. Short on funds, as immigrants are wont to be, they were grateful when
the Russian Tsar (strapped for cash though he was himself) stepped in and
offered to build their churches for them. But the offer came with strings:
use the Russian language during services, and/or name the church as a Russian
one (Kuropas, M., The Ukrainian Americans, University of Toronto Press
1991).
If one is to believe that
an entire country can switch allegiances as readily as the faithful congregations
did in early 20th century America, then the (typically pro-Ukrainian
and anti-Russian) Diaspora might consider sending financial aid to Ukraine
with a similar set of strings, only this time demanding that the recipients
support the Ukrainian language. Rebounding from the secular era imposed by
the Soviets, the immediate post-independence period sent much of Ukraine into
a frenzied rush to build churches to the point where towns competed against
each other in speed and design, building bigger and better churches than ever
before seen. Much of the construction was enabled by dollars funneled from
the West, that is to say, the Ukrainian Diaspora in the West. Insofar as individuals
as opposed to organizations sent most of the money, there was no concerted
effort on the part of the Diaspora to contract for the strict use of the Ukrainian
language in the new facilities (or, for that matter, demanding allegiance
to the Kyivan Patriarch, the Moscow Patriarch’s favorite nemesis). Hence,
the opportunities to follow a precedent based on history may be lost.
All the same, while such
a plan may produce positive results on a small case-by-case basis, there is
little evidence to suggest that such an action would yield wide-ranging substantive
results today. In comparison to the billions of dollars in government aid
the United States along with certain European countries have either transferred
or promised to Ukraine with their own set of conditions that do not and would
not include a language provision, lesser amounts of aid from the Diaspora
would hardly have an impact on the recipients unless they were already predisposed
to speaking Ukrainian.
If you haven’t already figured
it out, my opinion is that Ukraine is better off having a single language
system – a Ukrainian one. This is the efficient option since documentation
will be recorded only in one language – no need for translations and less
paper used (call me an environmentalist). It may, at worst, create temporary
jobs for translators, at least until the Russian speakers in government are
replaced in elections or by attrition (this presumes, of course, that the
next generation of politicians will be Ukrainian speakers). Moreover, Ukrainian
is the language of the majority of the population. And last, but not least,
it’s simply easier for the rest of the world to remember that Ukrainian is
the official/state/national language of Ukraine.
On the other hand, if a monolingual policy leads to irreconcilable
internal differences, then the second best choice might be to amend the constitution
based on the U.S. model - i.e., have no official or state language at all. Over time,
Ukraine could integrate incentives into its institutions that would encourage a Ukrainian
choice: know the language and get into better schools, find better jobs, etc. Then later,
say, about the year 2203, having thrived for 200 years under a democratic and independent
government, whatever language is the most robust (Ukrainian?) can be brought to the
parliamentary table at that time.
Kak, yak – who cares?
Can one be a Ukrainian without
speaking the language? Why not? Those of us in the Diaspora often refer to
ourselves as Ukrainians, even if only hyphenated (or unhyphenated) ones. Can
one be a Russian-speaker and a patriotic Ukrainian? Of course! There are plenty
of examples – even super patriots Wladimir and Vitaly Klitschko, the famous
boxing duo, have a difficult time speaking Ukrainian. Yet, their allegiance
to Ukraine is beyond question. Do ethnic Russians living in Ukraine identify
themselves as Ukrainian? The recent census results showing a shift in the
size of the population claiming Ukrainian ethnicity may be an indicator of
exactly that.
Nevertheless, the question
of language for some is indelibly tied to the question of national identity,
and the question of national identity is indelibly tied to sovereignty. Ukraine’s
historical relationship to Russia is a centuries-old struggle for sovereignty
and identity, therefore the language issue frequently finds itself at the
heart of arguments in support of Ukraine’s nation-building stage.
As one might expect, the
linguistic policies of 350+ years of a nation russified by design cannot be
unraveled in the short space of a decade or two. By way of comparison, even
though slaves in America were liberated with the Emancipation Proclamation
in 1863 after several hundred years of being subjected to white supremacy
and racism, the subservience of blacks and white dominance was still pervasive
and palpably evident in our society 100 years later. The cultural conditioning
on both sides ran so deep that shedding the legal manacles led to only gradual
changes that were still being sorted out well into the next century. Legislation
for civil rights, desegregation, and affirmative action finally had to be
enacted in the 1960’s and 1970’s in order to accelerate the process of restoring
the human rights and dignity that centuries of slavery had robbed from the
blacks.
Surely, then, a demoralized Ukraine deserves
more than 12 years in order to restore its cultural heritage and, in particular,
its language.
Thus, setting an unambiguous
language policy based on the Baltic (and not Balkan) model which supports
the growth and development of a nation’s mother tongue becomes one of the
most critical elements in sustaining and nurturing a country’s independence
and national identity – exactly what the doctor ordered for Ukraine.
Mr. Udovenko’s “prediction”
last summer suggests that the outcome is a fait accompli in the Verkhovna Rada and no
further discussion that might derail the proposals should be expected. However,
it may be a bit premature to assume that one or both of the Myronenko/Hrach
bills will be passed and signed into law. If you ask me, a) the jury is out
on this one until it comes to a vote; b) it ain’t over until the fat lady
sings; c) George Walker Bush wasn’t sure even 6 weeks after
the votes were cast that his henchmen had manipulated enough of the electorate
to make the election go his way, so don’t be countin’ dem chickens before the eggs ‘r’ hatched.
Even if the communist-proposed
bills do pass (Gevalt! Horror! Æàõ!), proponents
of the Ukrainian language both in Ukraine and abroad mustn’t despair. If a
constitution can be changed once, it can be changed twice (this is only a last chance
alternative since an unstable constitution would be perceived to be a weak
one). The linguistic preferences of the nation as a whole may change enough over time
to mandate another look at its official language policy. We may even see a
non-communist deputy proposing to amend the state language
provision yet again – that time and for all time – to be Ukrainian, all Ukrainian, and nothing but Ukrainian.
* * *
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Hearings
of the language bills took place in the Verkhovna Rada in March 2003.It was
not possible to ascertain from the V.R. website exactly when voting is scheduled
to take place, but it does indicate that Bill 2549 is being reviewed in the Committee
on Legal Policy, and Bill 2457 is in the hands of the Committee on Cultural
and Religious Questions. The VR is currently embroiled in another battle:
the political struggle between the current administration and the opposition
over proposed constitutional changes to the structure of Ukraine’s government.
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