BRAMA, Feb. 27, 2000, 12:00pm EST

All Change in the Verkhovna Rada: How and Why Parliamentary Opposites Attract and Repel.

– by Markian Bilynskyj, Director of Field Operations, U.S.-Ukraine Foundation, Kyiv, Ukraine (February 24, 2000)

A political crisis can be defined as a challenge – successful or otherwise – to the legitimacy of an existing order, characterized by a partial or complete breakdown of the policy process. Using this definition, the events in the Verkhovna Rada between January 18 and February 17 – when the parliament formally divided into a pro-reform majority and a minority Left opposition, elected a new leadership, and adopted the budget – bore some of the hallmarks of a crisis. Essentially, however, it was a remarkably smooth transformation from a deadlocked parliament into a functioning legislature capable, for the time being at least, of enacting a coherent agenda and willing to be held accountable for its actions.

A genuine parliamentary crisis might still arise, though, should either the Constitutional Court uphold the Left minority's appeal regarding the legitimacy of the majority's activities; or, more likely, if the majority turns out to be short-lived. Looking further ahead, a crisis could also materialize if the president proceeds with implementing the results of the referendum scheduled for April 16. (This referendum is in fact nothing less than a program for restructuring the Rada that, according to polls, has widespread popular support.) But, even allowing for the risks inherent in poring over political developments at close quarters, it seems that it is the parliamentary Left and the Left in general that is currently experiencing a genuine crisis. For the period in question saw them lose control of the two highest positions in the Rada, as well as of eight committees and 14 deputy chairs. Natalya Vitrenko's Progressive Socialist Party's faction, which had for some time existed without the required minimum of 14 members, was also dissolved (after the Communists refused to "loan" her some of their deputies), and rumors abound over the imminent creation of a pro-Ukrainian communist party based on disaffected elements of the existing Communist and Socialist parties.

Until January 21, the final day of the fourth parliamentary session, the Rada was presided over by a chairman whose political ambitions and sense of indispensability were matched only by his limitations. Oleksandr Tkachenko had been elected essentially by default 18 months earlier as elements within the Rada and beyond fought to prevent the chairmanship from falling into the hands of anyone harboring presidential ambitions. His eventual, somewhat surprise decision to run brought about a further politicization of the legislative process and was the principal reason behind the Rada's growing ineffectiveness. Tkachenko's final unabashed identification with the Communist candidate – a fitting conclusion to what can only be described as a parody of an election campaign – represented an abandonment of any pretense at impartiality and irreversibly undermined his credibility as Rada chairman. At the same time, President Leonid Kuchma's re-election altered the broader political context within which the Rada had to operate to such an extent that Tkachenko was transformed from a largely compromise figure into an anachronism.

During the presidential campaign, Kuchma had promised that his re-election would see both a "new" president and a "new" parliament. This newness has manifested itself first and foremost in the installation of a progressive, pragmatic government and a previously absent determination to remove all obstacles to its smooth functioning. With respect to the Rada, the president made it clear on numerous occasions that what was now required was a cooperative legislature consisting of a stable, pro-reform majority. He has offered the Rada a negative incentive in the shape of the aforementioned referendum, possibly followed by pre-term parliamentary elections, and, simultaneously, a positive one that should the Rada get its act together, talk of early elections would become "redundant." Kuchma reiterated the latter point in his annual address to the parliament on February 22.

The operational code of the Rada has always been dictated as much by tacit norms as written regulations. Agenda-setting, the presentation of draft legislation and the actual vote on these and other parliamentary prerogatives have rarely taken place without (generally valid) accusations of procedural violations. Since no side held a monopoly in this respect, the role of the chairman, particularly his ability to manipulate proceedings, has always been pivotal. This convention came to be tolerated within certain bounds. The chairman's informal prerogatives were, and remain, particularly consequential if the formal regulations, as is currently the case, exist in draft form only.

It was therefore not surprising that the proximate cause for the rupture within the Rada was a dispute over procedure. On January 18, deputies belonging to eleven pro-reform factions moved to amend the regulations for changing the Rada leadership so that it would be more reflective of the new disposition of forces within the parliament. Tkachenko initially refused on the grounds that the motion first had to be reviewed by the Rules Committee. But, when the vote eventually occurred and produced more than the 226 votes required, Tkachenko declared it invalid because of procedural violations. The next day, the Majority proposed that Tkachenko and his Communist first deputy, Adam Martyniuk, be suspended while their activities were investigated. Chairman Tkachenko refused to include these and other questions in the agenda, thereby placing his own survival as chairman above the Rada's interests as interpreted by a legitimate majority.

After three days, as much to avoid physical confrontations as to ensure the Rada's ability to function, the Majority left the Rada building and reconvened the following day at another location, the Ukraine House. (The media feasted on the irony of these new, but anti-Communist Bolshevyky – Russian for majority – choosing a venue that had originally been built as a museum to celebrate the life and times of Lenin.) There, under the temporary leadership of Deputy Chairman Viktor Medvychuk, the 242 registered deputies dismissed Tkachenko and Martyniuk. They also established a committee to investigate the activities of the ex-chairman and of the Rada secretariat that had been under his control, voted amendments to the parliamentary regulations, approved the removal of the Soviet symbols on the Rada building, and appointed a new governor of the National Bank of Ukraine

The following week, the interim between the fourth and fifth sessions, the Majority worked at resolving its internal differences over the selection of a new leadership, including committee chairmanships, through a Coordinating Council presided over by former president Leonid Kravchuk. The Left, meanwhile, remained in the "real" Rada building, with Tkachenko refusing to acknowledge that he had been unseated. At this time, some of the more realistic members of the Left, acknowledging that the situation within the Rada was becoming unfavorable, commenced negotiations with the Majority to reach an accommodation in time for the opening of the fifth session on February 1.

As expected, the two sides marked the opening of the new session at their separate locations (although the Minority, lacking a quorum, simply went through the motions). The Majority, now numbering 265, then proceeded to elect a new Rada chairman, Ivan Pliushch, who had previously chaired the parliament from 1991-94, and his two deputies. They also chose new committee chairs, altered the numbering of the Radas that had existed since independence, and abolished the public holidays commemorating the October Revolution. They then retired to work in committees, where they were joined by the more moderate representatives of the Minority. Meanwhile, with a total of approximately 180 deputies, the representatives of the Communist, Peasant, Socialist, and Progressive Socialist parties, clearly fell short of the 226 threshold that would have allowed them to function as a legislature. Despite further attempts at reconciliation, they resorted to appealing to the Constitutional Court.

On February 7, the new leadership caught those elements of the Left who had been keeping vigil in the Rada by surprise and gained access to the leadership's offices. There, they began planning for the plenary session scheduled to begin the following day. They were assisted in this by the Rada's security unit, which later blocked a feeble effort by a small group of Left radicals (some of whom probably weakened by their hunger strike) to re-take the premises. On February 8, the Majority arrived in the Rada plenary chamber and, with the exception of one or two minor scuffles, took up strategic positions in order to secure Pliushch's access to the presidium. When the session began, the Minority were in their seats, but had refused to register. Having thus disqualified themselves from officially participating in the session, they attempted to disrupt proceedings by hammering all day on their desks with anything at hand, orchestrating the occasional collective chanting, and displaying protest banners for the media's attention. Realizing the vacuity – or plain silliness – of this behavior, the Minority returned to the session hall the next day, but the Communists walked out after their leader, Petro Symonenko, received a reprimand for his behavior.

However, none of this was sufficient to prevent a successful repeat second, or, indeed, third and final vote on the budget the following week. Moreover, on both occasions a number of deputies from the Left, principally Socialists but also a dozen Communists participated in the debates. (Meanwhile, to add to the ex-chairman's woes, the Pechersk District Court charged Tkachenko and Martyniuk with obstructing the work of the new Rada leadership, while the ex-chairman's tiny faction confronted the very real danger of going the way of the Progressive Socialists.)

Events unfolded in a manner that saw the Minority marginalized almost to the point of irrelevance. In short, by displaying an unprecedented unity, the Majority were now in the position of authority and responsibility they had sought in order to fulfill their role as co-equals in the new political order Kuchma and Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko are calling for.

There has been much heated debate over the legality of the recent activities and maneuvers of each camp. The Majority and the Presidential Administration obviously entertain no such doubts. The very evening the new leadership was elected, Kuchma met with Pliushch and his deputies. The two sides, not altogether inaccurately, considered the confrontation to be all over bar the shouting. Moreover, Kuchma has signed all of the legislation that he has so far received from the "new" Rada, while the Ministry of Justice has declared its satisfaction with the propriety of the Majority's activities falling under its purview. Nor is the Constitutional Court likely to alter the trajectory of events by upholding to any significant degree the Left's appeal, particularly given the momentum these have acquired. The Left have declared that they will not participate fully in the work of the Rada until the Court passes judgement. Thus, with the Court apparently in no hurry to examine the matter, the most practical course of action for the Left now appears to lie in reorganizing – perhaps through consolidation – in preparation for possible elections, and in hoping that the potentially debilitating differences inherent in the Majority re-assert themselves.

Pliushch has declared that his goal is to ensure that the current Rada serves its full term until 2002. However, there are clearly grounds for concern over the future of the Majority. Not only does it contain parties whose representatives hold differing views over the desirability of pre-term elections, but it is composed of a broad range of previously incompatible national- and social-democratic, as well as business interests bound together by concerns ranging from a genuine commitment to reforms to a mercenary anxiety over re-election prospects. (By way of an aside, it was, arguably, the inability and unwillingness of this non-Left majority to cooperate constructively in the past and their celerity in courting the Left in order to safeguard or pursue their narrow interests that was in large measure responsible for the disproportionate impact of the Communists and their brethren on the legislative process. Developments within the Rada over the previous month should perhaps therefore prompt a reassessment regarding the true source and nature of the baneful dynamics within the legislature that allowed, for example, the elevation of mediocrity to leadership positions – developments that were perhaps all too readily and facilely attributed exclusively to the Left.)

In electing a new Rada leadership, abolishing tax privileges for enterprises with foreign investments, and adopting an unprecedentedly severe budget, the Majority has negotiated some potentially serious obstacles to its survival. But, the processes leading to these achievements revealed how enduring and close to the surface the differences remain. For example, while Medvychuk withdrew his candidacy for chairman in favor of Pliushch with a minimum of fuss, personal enmity seems to have undermined Yuriy Kostenko's candidacy for deputy chairman when Hennadiy Udovenko's Rukh and its allies threatened to leave the Majority should Kostenko be elected. Still other groups and factions were unhappy over the allocation of the committee chairs.

However, it was the budget process that perhaps best reveals the tensions within the Majority. While the budget was passed very quickly in its second reading, this was done at the price of setting aside the most controversial points. Thus, even following the budget's formal adoption after a third reading, six articles of expenditure await approval pending the adequate provision of revenues. This, in turn, depends on the adoption of a package of eight laws that promise to substantially impact the personal and corporate interests represented within the Majority. However, having already conceded to the government on the matter of tax exemptions, it is very probable that these laws too will be passed.

Despite this unprecedented degree of legislative productivity and inter-governmental cooperation, some commentators do not expect the Majority, and hence this Rada, to last much beyond the completion of the budget process. They point out that the passage of Ukraine's first balanced budget was orchestrated by the Administration through its allies – even emissaries – in the Rada in time for the visit of the latest IMF delegation. With that, they argue, the Majority will have served its purpose. That the Administration was involved is clear – as was the fact that given the overall situation and its continuing vulnerability with respect to the executive branch, the Rada, in the shape of the Majority had little choice but to bite the bullet on the tax exemptions and budget issues. But, the extent to which the Administration was involved is not. Certainly, the ubiquitous Oleksandr Volkov was prominent. Working furiously and effectively to prove his continuing indispensability to the Administration, Volkov in fact emerged as something of a self-appointed Majority whip.

The current compromise – an unstable equilibrium at best – was, and remains, a product of both coercion and consent, even though articulation of this consent has not yet gone much beyond declarations by some key individuals within the Majority that it is neither pro-presidential, nor pro-government, but pro-reform. Pliushch's role will therefore be critical in turning the current amorphous sense of unity into the kind of durable, genuine compromise the Majority – and the Rada – must achieve if it is to continue as a viable and independent actor within the reform process.

Permission is granted to copy or cite this Update on Ukraine, provided that credit is given to Markian Bilynskyj, Director of Field Operations for the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation in Kyiv, Ukraine.

The U.S.-Ukraine Foundation is a non-profit organization that supports the development of democracy and civil society in Ukraine through a variety of projects.

The U.S.-Ukraine Foundation, 733 15th Street, Suite 1026, Washington, DC 20005. Tel: (202) 347 4264, Fax: (202) 347 4267. Email usuf@usukraine.org. Website: www.usukraine.org.